Do Information Rents in Loan Spreads Persist over the Business Cycles?

In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for information rents in loan spreads by analyzing a sample of UK syndicated loan contracts for the period from 1996 to 2005. We use various measures for borrower opaqueness and control for bank, borrower and loan characteristics and we find that undercapitalized banks charge approximately 34 bps higher loan spreads for loans to opaque borrowers. We further analyze whether this effect persists throughout the business cycle and find that this effect prevails only during recessions. However, we do not find evidence that banks exploit their information monopolies during expansion phases.     

Financing agricultural R&D in rich countries: what's happening and why

Governments everywhere are trimming their support for agricultural R&D, giving greater scrutiny to the support that they do provide, and reforming the public agencies that fund, oversee, and carry out the research. This represents a break from previous patterns, which had consisted of expansion in the public funds for agricultural R&D. Private-sector spending on agricultural research has slowed along with the growth of public spending in recent years, but the balance continues to shift towards the private sector. This article presents a quantitative review of these funding trends and the considerable institutional changes that have accompanied them. We discuss new data for 22 OECD countries, providing institutional details for five of these countries, and conclude with an assessment of policy developments.     

Covert operations

Few executives have insight into what really goes on in their organizations. CEO Stephen Martin seized a rare opportunity to anonymously discover the nitty gritty of his company. He shares his insights with Julian Birkinshaw and Stuart Crainer.     

The globalization of Chinese enterprises

The question of how and why Chinese firms globalize is one of the most pressing issues for businesses today. China's globalization process is nothing less than remarkable. The twenty‐first century will feature a developing country as the leader of the global economy by 2020, when, by most estimates, China's purchasing power parity (PPP) gross domestic product (GDP) surpasses America's. With China's new role on the world's stage, global economic and political institutions are likely to change. China's foray into Latin America, for example, has changed the traditional role that America has played in its “backyard.” While the Chinese government was given much credit for China's globalization, Chinese private‐ and family‐owned businesses have also propelled China outward. Our research stream and annual China Goes Global conference at Harvard has attempted to frame the questions associated with China's globalization. This special issue is another important step in this direction. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?

Economic theory points to five parties disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in takeovers, nonexecutive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This paper reports the first comparative evaluation of the role of these different parties in disciplining management. We find that, in the United Kingdom, most parties, including holders of substantial share blocks, exert little disciplining and that some, for example, inside holders of share blocks and boards dominated by nonexecutive directors, actually impede it. Bidders replace a high proportion of management of companies acquired in takeovers but do not target poorly performing management. In contrast, during periods of financial constraints prompting distressed rights issues and capital restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the United States, where there is little evidence of a role for new equity issues but nonexecutive directors and acquirers of share blocks perform a disciplinary function. The different governance outcomes are attributed to differences in minority investor protection in two countries with supposedly similar common law systems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G3.